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Compensatory control theory proposes that people can compensate for a loss of personal control 
through endorsement of external sources of structure like ideologies. Social identity and self-
categorization theories provide evidence that ideologies, as group-based beliefs, are endorsed 
more strongly by highly identified group members compared to those lower in identification. The 
present studies integrate these perspectives in order to investigate the use of ideology as a source 
of compensation. In all three studies a group-based control threat (vs. control boost) was 
employed to manipulate the perceived personal control of women participants. Study 1 (N = 151) 
investigated the potential interaction of threat and identification on the endorsement of gender 
egalitarianism and benevolent sexism. Study 2 (N = 161) investigated the degree to which 
identification and threat interacted to predict perceptions of order and structure for a gender-
equal society, and whether these perceptions affect support for gender egalitarianism (a 
moderated-mediation model was tested). Study 3 (N = 190) investigated the degree to which 
identification and threat interacted to predict perceived personal control following a group-based 
threat to personal control, and the indirect effect of threat on perceived control through the 
endorsement of gender egalitarianism (a moderated-mediation model was tested). Across all 3 
studies results revealed significant interactions between gender identification and a group-based 
threat to control on ideology endorsement, perceived structure of social relations, and perceived 
personal control. The integration of these theoretical perspectives on control threat, 
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My group, our beliefs: Compensating for threats to individual control through the collective 
People generally expect they will be able to achieve desired outcomes and influence the 
world around them (e.g., efficacy; Bandura, 1977). Perceiving control over one’s life is a vital 
aspect of physical and psychological well-being which often translates into important mental and 
physical outcomes (Greenaway, Cichocka, Van Veelen, Likki, & Branscombe, 2014; Knight, 
Haslam, & Haslam, 2010; Schulz, 1976; Steptoe & Appels, 1989). A sense of control over life’s 
outcomes helps people maintain a sense that the social world is well-ordered and predictable 
(Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). 
Historically, personal control was studied by focusing on either internal psychological 
processes (e.g., locus of control; see Lefcourt, 1981) or the influence of social contexts that 
afford control (e.g., secondary control; see Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Recent research 
on personal control has begun focusing on the interaction between these processes, noting that an 
individual’s perception of control goes beyond their personal agency (i.e., ability to act) and is in 
part embedded in social systems they perceive as providing meaningful order to the world (e.g., 
strong federal government; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008).  
Despite the importance of perceived personal control for positive psychological 
functioning, these perceptions are sometimes challenged by chaotic or uncontrollable events 
(Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). In the event of a threat to perceived control, research from a 
compensatory control perspective commonly finds that people compensate for this loss by 
increasing their support for external sources of order (e.g., a controlling deity). As reviewed in 
detail below, researchers have found that when personal control is low, individuals can turn to a 




While the aforementioned theory and research provides an informative, multi-level view 
on control, it has not yet investigated compensation for specific types of threat to personal 
control, such as threats based upon a target’s personal characteristics or experiences (e.g., death 
of a loved one), or the target’s social group memberships (e.g., discrimination). The present work 
focuses on the experience of low personal control due to being a member of a social group. For 
example, when a person learns that members of their group (e.g., women) are excluded from a 
certain outcome (e.g., being the CEO of a company), they may feel a lack of personal control 
over future occupational outcomes despite their own efforts (e.g., excluded from promotion 
regardless of their individual merit). Indeed, meta-analyses of the discrimination and 
psychological well-being literature have revealed that perceived pervasive discrimination is 
predictive of poor well-being including lower feelings of control (Schmitt, Branscombe, 
Postmes, & Garcia, 2014; Verkuyten, 1998) and physical health (Paradies, 2006; Pascoe 
&Richman, 2009). This is regarded as a group-based threat to personal control as the value of 
the individual’s social group as a whole is threatened and decreases feelings of personal control 
for the individual group member.  
Existing research from a compensatory control perspective also neglects the role of social 
identification. This is a critical omission as identification with social groups influences how 
people interpret and structure their social world (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). The 
external sources of structure that individuals endorse for compensation may be determined by the 
degree to which they identify with the group(s) these sources represent. The connection between 
social identification and any motivated endorsement of social systems for compensation is 
important considering the overwhelming evidence that groups play a vital role in providing 
individuals with a feeling of personal control (Greenaway et al., 2015).  
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This paper focuses on the use of ideology as a source of compensation when individuals 
feel a loss of control due to their membership in a social group. This work extends CCT by 
including social identification processes in order to make more specific predictions about who 
compensates with what ideology following a control threat. This work also extends work within 
SIT/SCT by demonstrating how one consequence of group identification, strong support for a 
group’s norms and values, can have far-reaching consequences for how individuals cope with 
threatening information. 
A series of studies were conducted to examine how group identification influences the 
use of ideology as a control-compensation source. This work tests if a threat to personal control 
motivates the endorsement of an ideology that most group members support (i.e., group-
normative), and the rejection of an ideology that most members disagree with (i.e., non-
normative). It also tests the degree to which group members perceive their ideology as offering 
structure and order to the social world. Finally, this work tests if endorsing a group normative 
ideology restores perceptions of personal control after they have been threatened.  
As explained in detail below, compensatory control theory (CCT) offers a framework for 
understanding why individuals respond to a loss of personal control with greater endorsement of 
external sources of order (i.e., they provide order and structure to the social world; Kay, Sullivan, 
& Landau, 2014), as well as many of the external sources endorsed (e.g., a benevolent God; Kay 
et al., 2008) when control is lost. Additionally, social identity (SIT) and self-categorization 
(SCT) theories explain how social identification affects how individuals react to information 
concerning the group (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999), and how much they 
endorse group-normative ideologies (Hogg & Reid, 2006). These two perspectives are combined 
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to investigate the moderating effect of group identification on the use of ideology to compensate 
for a group-based threat to control.  
 Clifford Geertz (1966) argued that human thoughts are fundamentally social in origin, 
function, and application. Thoughts are expressed through symbols that are shared and 
understood by group members; shared because the group offers a collective understanding of 
their meaning. Following from Geertz’s cultural analysis, Remington (1971) conceptualized 
ideology as a shared set of values and beliefs that are grounded in a group’s shared outlook. For 
Remington, ideologies work to consolidate group cohesion and solidarity, which promotes 
identification with that group. Borrowing from these theoretical analyses, ideology is defined as 
a cohesive set of beliefs about the preferred structure of society that constitute a group’s shared 
perspective.  
The ideologies that people adhere to are a product of the social groups that they find 
meaningful. This statement is in accordance with many theoretical accounts of ideology found 
outside of social psychology. From Marx’s (Marx & Engels, 1932) conception of ideology as a 
representation of group-based interests aimed at legitimizing the oppression of those who do not 
control production), to Lane’s (1962) emphasis on ideologies as reflections of the norms and 
morals of a group acquired through identification, theorists outside of psychology have often 
focused heavily on the group-based nature of ideologies (e.g., ideological proxy, Converse, 
1964; representations of social institutions, Jackman, 1994; social representations from a 
group’s perspective, Mannheim, 1936; social values, Feldman, 2003). 
 Theorists have often emphasized that ideologies represent a set of beliefs shared by group 
members that are used to understand, defend, or change the existing social structure. While many 
perspectives in social psychology acknowledge that ideologies are group-based belief systems, 
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they often place emphasis on ideologies held by dominant groups (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, & 
Galinsky, 2014; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Thorisdottir, 
Jost, & Kay, 2009) and neglect to consider the process of identification as a fundamental 
requirement of expressing ideology.  
Social identity theory on the other hand places group identification at the heart of 
ideological endorsement (Haslam et al., 2010; Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Hogg, Meehan, & 
Farquharson, 2010) and is useful for understanding the use of ideology as a source of 
compensation. The selection and endorsement of a particular ideology may be dependent upon 
how much an individual identifies with the social group associated with the ideology. This 
argument is expanded upon later in the paper, but first CCT’s account of control compensation is 
outlined.   
Compensatory Control Theory 
 Compensatory control theory argues that the desire people have to feel in control over 
their lives (i.e., personal control) is derived from the even more fundamental need to perceive the 
social world as structured and ordered. If one has control over what happens to them (e.g., work 
hard and thereby gain success), then it follows that the world has a predictable order and 
outcomes can be anticipated, achieved or avoided (Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). When 
something interrupts or threatens the individual’s perception of control, there is an underlying 
experience of chaos and unpredictability (Kay et al., 2014) which increases anxiety (Kay, 
Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010). Anxiety then motivates a desire to reduce this negative state (Kay 
& Eibach, 2013). One of the ways individuals can reduce anxiety and reestablish a perception of 
control is to increase their support for an external agent of structure and order (e.g., benevolent 
god, strong national government; Kay et al., 2008; Rothbaum et al., 1982).  
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Sources of structure. Compensatory control theory argues that humans have a need to 
see their social world as having order and structure. This underlies the contention that personal 
control is one way to satisfy that need, and when personal control is threatened, this avenue to 
perceiving structure is temporarily blocked (Kay & Eibach, 2013; Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 
2014). People can compensate for this threat by circumventing the perception that personal 
control leads to a structured world, and instead focus on an external source they perceive as 
capable of providing order to the social world for them (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 
2009).  
This argument is at the core of the CCT postulated control-restoration process as only 
those external systems that provide order and structure (vs. those that do not) should be suitable 
for control compensation. For example, in two studies, American participants indicated that 
work-place hierarchy was a more structured social system than work-place equality. Additional 
studies found that participants endorsed hierarchy more than equality when their personal control 
was threatened. These researchers also found that individuals higher in need-for-structure were 
higher in preference-for-hierarchy. Finally, when the authors framed hierarchy as un-structured, 
they found that individuals were less supportive of hierarchy compared to equality when 
personal control was threatened (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, & Galinsky, 2014). This work argues that 
hierarchical social arrangements are perceived as more structured than equal social 
arrangements, and therefore preferred as compensation sources. While this line of research 
provides important evidence that a desire for structure motivates the endorsement of an external 
system when personal control is threatened, there are two factors unaddressed by the authors that 
might alter how these findings are interpreted.  
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First, the samples used in these studies were comprised of American participants, 
members of a culture where economic individualism and hierarchical social systems are 
normative (Feldman, 1983; Lipset, 1979; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For this reason, it might be 
that work-place hierarchy was rated as more structured than work-place equality because it 
represents a social norm. It is also plausible that highly identified Americans in these samples 
drove the main effect of preference for hierarchy and its endorsement following a control threat. 
Without a measure of American or workplace identification, it is unknown whether participant 
levels of identification with their social group affected their perceptions of structure for work-
place hierarchy. Second, a motivation to perceive structure in the social world may influence 
how structured different social systems are rated when personal control has been threatened 
(Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). The authors found that when control is not manipulated, 
American participants rate hierarchy as more structured than equality. It is possible that 
following a threat to control, the ratings of a social system’s structure may be influenced by the 
desire to perceive structure (a drive outlined in CCT as a result of a loss of control; Kay, 
Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). An individual motivated to look for structure in the social world (due 
to a loss of personal control) may heighten their ratings of structure for a group-normative social 
system. This increased perception of structure could lead to a greater endorsement of that system 
as a way to reinforce the perception that order and structure are in place. Combining these two 
observations, it is plausible that individuals who are highly identified with a social group will see 
a group-normative ideology as more structured when motivated to compensate for a loss of 
personal control. This point is addressed later on.    
 Sources of compensation. Compensatory control research has illustrated a variety of 
social systems that individuals can turn to when their personal control is low. For example, 
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participants who suffered a threat to their personal control were more supportive of a life-
ordering god over a god that was merely responsible for creation (Kay et al., 2008). Additional 
studies have shown that threats to personal control (vs. no threat) result in stronger support for a 
national culture focused on law and order (Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011), belief in 
conspiracy theories (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), faith in ordered origins of life theories (i.e., a 
distinctly ordered evolutionary process vs. a random evolutionary process; Rutjens, van der Pligt, 
& van Harreveld, 2010), belief in precognitive abilities (Greenaway, Louis, & Hornsey, 2013), 
endorsement of meritocracy (Goode, Keefer, & Molina, 2014), and belief in the existence and 
power of one’s enemies (Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010).  
According to CCT, ideologies work like any other external source (e.g., God, 
government) when individuals are motivated to compensate for a loss of personal control. CCT 
argues that due to their structured nature of explaining social relations, people can use an 
ideology to re-establish their sense that the world is not chaotic or random. For example, 
participants primed to remember a time they lacked personal control (vs. remembering a time 
they had complete control) reported more anxiety concerning their future. As a means of 
managing this anxiety, these participants endorsed an economic ideology (i.e., meritocracy) 
significantly more than participants in the other condition. This elevated endorsement of 
meritocracy enabled these participants to become just as optimistic about their future economic 
prospects as individuals who did not experience a threat to their control (Goode, Keefer, & 
Molina, 2014).  
Work within CCT has provided support for the argument that when personal control is 
threatened, a) the individual perceives less structure and order to their social world (Kay, 
Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2011), b) this motivates the endorsement of an external system 
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perceived as providing order and structure to the world (Kay et al., 2008; Goode et al., 2014). 
However, this perspective has not yet addressed social identification, a key component of social 
life. Social identification may affect what ideology (if any) a group member endorses following a 
threat to personal control. The degree to which members assess their group’s ideological beliefs 
as representing a structured social system (regardless of whether that system is hierarchical or 
equitable) might also be dependent upon identification with the group. Finally, social 
identification is likely to affect if the endorsement of the group’s ideology works to restore 
perceptions of personal control.  
The present studies treat identification as a factor people bring to a situation that affects 
how they interpret and respond in a specific context. Many individuals identify with specific 
groups and this identity carries over into many different contexts (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; 
Turner, 1999). However, group identification is also not a static trait that is always constant. 
Self-categorization theory has illustrated the factors that lead to increased or decreased group 
identification due to a specific context, as well as many of the outcomes associated with it 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Both of these factors are important for 
understanding the effect of identification as they represent a cyclical process. A certain context 
may motivate an individual to align with a specific group and increase their endorsement of that 
group’s ideology for the moment. At the same time that social identity can carry over into many 
other contexts and filter how the individual reacts in other situations. This paper focuses on the 
process by which individuals bring a social identity into a specific context, and how levels of 
identification with that group effect their response to threat. 
Work within SIT and SCT has provided extensive evidence that the degree to which 
individuals value, or identify with, a social group affects how they respond to group-relevant 
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information (e.g., threat to the group’s value; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). 
This work also shows that when people identify with their social groups, they come to strongly 
endorse the group’s ideology (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Finally, recent work has found that 
identification with a group can promote perceptions of personal control (Greenaway et al., 2015).  
The Self and the Group 
Social identity theory states that one’s social identity is that part of the individual’s self-
concept derived from their group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Rather than seeing 
groups as simply a collection of individual people, or intergroup relations as an abstraction of 
interpersonal relations, SIT argues that groups are psychologically meaningful identities that can 
help define an individual’s sense of self (Haslam et al., 2010).  
 Self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) builds upon SIT to propose that 
identifying with a group causes individuals to think and behave as they believe a “typical” group 
member should. When a person aligns with a social identity, the individual begins to think in 
terms of we instead of I. As a result, individuals begin to see themselves as less of a distinct 
person and more as an interchangeable representative of the group (i.e., depersonalization; 
Abrams, & Hogg, 1990). Also important is the degree to which the individual already identifies 
with that social group when faced with a group-relevant social context (Doosje & Ellemers, 
1997; Turner, 1999) as this can shape how group-relevant information is interpreted (i.e., seeing 
a connection to their “self” or disregarding the information as irrelevant to their “self”; Oakes, 
Haslam, & Turner, 1994).  
SCT and SIT often use the terms “low-identifiers” and “high-identifiers” to conceptually 
differentiate those who only somewhat value a group identity from those who highly value it 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Turner, 1999). In response to information that 
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threatens the group’s value on a certain dimension, low identified group members will often 
distance themselves from the group by seeing themselves as distinct individuals (Wann & 
Branscombe, 1991). High-identified group members, on the other hand, often respond by 
increasing their identification and commitment to the group’s norms and beliefs. In a study on 
collective self-esteem, Branscombe and Wann (1994) found that compared to low identified 
participants, those who were highly identified with the social group Americans experienced 
decreased collective self-esteem (CSE) following a threat (vs. no threat) to their social group’s 
value (i.e., an American losing a boxing match to a Russian). This decrease in CSE directly led 
to increased derogation of Russians, which in turn led to a subsequent increase in CSE. 
Conversely, low identified group members did not significantly differ in either CSE or outgroup 
derogation between experimental conditions. Highly identified group members responded to a 
group-based threat by defending their group and derogating threatening outgroup members. This 
allowed the high identifiers to alleviate the threat to their collective self-esteem and reestablish 
their feelings of group worth. Low identified individuals in contrast did not seem to suffer from 
the threat (no significant loss of CSE) nor were they motivated to derogate any outgroups. This 
work illustrates how responses to a group-based threat vary by the degree to which group 
members find that social identity meaningful. 
Group Identity and Ideology. As individuals increase their identification with a social 
group, they also increase their support of that group’s ideological beliefs (Hogg & Reid, 2006). 
For example, researchers have found that high identifiers are more supportive of the group’s 
ideology and actions than low identifiers (i.e., authoritarianism; protests; Hogg, Meehan, & 
Farquharson, 2010). In another series of studies, Palestinian participants who highly identified 
with their national group endorsed more extremist ideological beliefs and behaviors pertaining to 
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the Palestinian/Israeli conflict (i.e., use of suicide bombings to attack Israelis) compared to those 
lower in identification. At the same time, Israeli participants who highly identified with their 
national group more strongly endorsed the use of strong military tactics to combat the Palestinian 
forces. High identifiers from both of these national groups supported extremist ideological 
beliefs (held by a subset of the larger Palestinian and Israeli population) and actions reflecting 
their ideological stance (Hogg & Adelman, 2013).  
In sum, social identity is an aspect of the self that is defined by the social groups that 
people value. The groups that people identify with and are as much a part of their identity as 
their personal self. Identifying with social groups promotes psychological cohesion between 
group members with regards to social norms, attitudes and behaviors (Hogg & Reid, 2006). 
Individuals who highly identify with their group accept and express their group’s ideology more 
so low identifiers (Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010). 
How much individuals identify with a group is not only related to how they react to a 
group-based threat, or how much they endorse a group’s shared beliefs, but is also directly 
related to their feelings of personal control.  
Personal Control via the Group 
 Earlier research from a SIT/SCT perspective addressed how identifying with a group can 
promote perceptions of control through collective action and group-based efficacy (Haslam, 
Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003; Turner, 1982; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). More 
recent research has begun to examine the relationship between social identification and 
perceptions of personal rather than collective control. 
 Greenaway et al. (2015) shows that people can gain a sense of personal control through 
identification with a social group. In a series of studies the authors found a connection between 
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social identification, personal control and positive health outcomes. Using the world values 
survey, the authors found that across 47 countries, group identification lead to increased life 
satisfaction and happiness (self-report) and that perceived personal control positively moderated 
this relationship. In another study, the authors found that increased identification with one’s 
political party predicted greater life satisfaction, and this effect was mediated by increased 
perceptions of personal control. For both U.S. Democrats and Republicans who differed in 
whether their group had recently sustained a major loss or not, there was a direct link between 
social identity and perceived personal control; this effect was not moderated by party preference. 
In another study, the authors employed a longitudinal design and a manipulation of social 
identity. They found that higher levels of social identification led to increased feelings of 
personal control, and that perceptions of personal control directly led to improved health. These 
findings indicate that people are able to gain a sense of personal control from their group 
memberships, and that this control has a direct bearing on their health.  
When people identify with their group they feel a greater sense of personal control 
(Greenaway et al., 2015). However, increased social identification is associated with many 
different outcomes, such as the expression of ideology (Hogg & Reid, 2006); the derogation of 
outgroups (Outten, Schmitt, Miller & Garcia, 2012); and even feelings of collective guilt (Wohl, 
Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). While prior research has shown that increased identification leads to 
greater perceived control, it has not specified how social identities ultimately provide this sense 





The current research was designed to examine the effect of group identification on how 
individuals compensate for group-based threats to their personal control. As already stated, 
previous work has yet to integrate social identification processes into a framework of control 
compensation through ideology. While past research within CCT has demonstrated that threats to 
personal control appear to motivate the endorsement of a variety of external sources of structure 
(e.g., Kay et al., 2008), and specifically that ideology is endorsed following a threat to control 
(Goode et al., 2014), it has neglected social identification as a factor in the compensation 
process.  
Similarly, SIT and SCT offer a comprehensive account of how social identification 
affects 1) individuals’ responses to a group-based threat (Branscombe et al., 1999; Branscombe 
& Wann, 1994); 2) endorsement of ideology (Hogg & Reid, 2006); and  3) perceptions of 
personal control (Greenaway et al., 2015). However, this research has not yet put these pieces 
together. The current studies draw upon the insight that a valued social identity can provide the 
resources to cope with threat based on group membership. Specifically, whether group-
normative ideologies provide a means of coping with group-based threats to control.  
The present studies are comprised of American samples from the social group women. 
All three studies investigated how women living in the U.S. responded to threatening 
information regarding their group’s experience in the occupational sphere. Women have a long 
history of inequality in the American workforce (e.g., lower wages, lower rate of promotions, 
sexual harassment; Acker, 2006). Consequently, many women are likely to have felt a lack of 
personal control due to sexism in the workplace. Study 1 investigates how levels of gender-
identification moderate women’s endorsement of gender-egalitarianism (vs. benevolent sexism) 
following a group-based threat to control. Study 2 assesses women’s perceptions of structure and 
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order for a gender equal society following a group-based threat (vs. no threat) to personal 
control, and if identification moderates this relationship. Study 3 investigates whether levels of 
identification with the group women interacts with a group-based threat to control on any effects 
of endorsing gender egalitarianism on restoring perceptions of personal control.  
Study 1 
Study 1 investigated the moderating effect of group identification on ideology 
endorsement for control compensation. Participant identification with the social group women 
was measured first to examine how differences in gender identification might affect responses to 
a group-based threat. Next, personal control was manipulated via group-based information such 
that participants were shown information indicating that women in the U.S. have experienced an 
increase (vs. decrease) in sexual discrimination incidents across several years within the 
workplace.  
Motivation to compensate for a loss of personal control through increased endorsement of 
a group-normative ideology, but not of a non-normative ideology was then tested. Gender 
egalitarianism, or the belief that women and men should have equal footing in society, was used 
as a group-normative ideology. In a recent national poll, researchers found that a majority of 
women in the U.S. support this belief (Wike & Simmons, 2015). In contrast, benevolent sexism, 
or the belief that that women should have restricted roles based upon natural gender differences, 
was included as a representation of a non-normative ideology. It is hypothesized that:  
H1: Highly identified women will endorse gender egalitarianism more than benevolent 
sexism following a group-based threat to their personal control.  
H2: Highly identified women will endorse gender egalitarianism more than lowly 
identified women following a group-based threat to personal control.  
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H3: Highly identified women will endorse gender egalitarianism more after a threat to 
personal control than highly identified women who did not experience a threat.  
Method 
 Participants. One-hundred sixty women residing in the United States (U.S.) participated 
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online service for a small financial incentive ($0.45). Nine 
participants were dropped from the analysis due to their failure to complete over 50% of the 
survey materials. The final sample (N = 151) ranged in age from 18 to 77 (M = 37.17, SD = 
13.61). Political ideology was measured on a scale from 0 = completely liberal to 100 = 
completely conservative and the sample was slightly skewed liberal (M = 42.13, SD = 31.77). 
When asked to indicate their ethnicity, 76.6% of participants self-categorized as White; 12.1% as 
Asian; 5.6% as Black; 4.8% as Latina; and 0.8% did not indicate their ethnicity.  
 Gender identity. Individual differences in gender identification were assessed using 4 
items modified from Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; “Overall, being a woman has very little to do 
with how I feel about myself (reverse scored);” “Being a woman is unimportant to my sense of 
what kind of person I am (reverse scored);” “Being a woman is an important reflection of who I 
am;” “In general, being a woman is an important part of my self-image.” Participants were asked 
to indicate their agreement using a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree) for 
these (and all subsequent) items. These items formed a reliable composite (α = .82) and scores 
were averaged (See Appendix A).  
 Group-based manipulation of personal control. Participants were randomly assigned 
to view one of two fabricated reports ostensibly from the United States Department of Justice 
describing rates of sexual discrimination against American women in the workforce over three 
years (2010-2013). In the group-based control threat condition participants saw a graph showing 
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rates of sexual discrimination as increasing. The accompanying text emphasized this trend: 
“Recent data from the National Institute of Justice shows that rather than getting better or 
staying the same over time, things are getting worse for women in the workforce. A new report 
states that verified and adjudicated incidents of sexual discrimination in the workforce has 
increased over time. Occupational discrimination prevents women from moving up in salary 
and/or position and at this point women have less control over their economic and occupational 
futures as in times past.”  
 Participants in the group-based control boost condition saw a graph showing rates of 
sexual discrimination against women as decreasing. The accompanying text emphasized this 
trend: “Recent data from the National Institute of Justice shows that rather than getting worse or 
staying the same over time, things are getting better for women in the workforce. A new report 
states that verified and adjudicated incidents of sexual discrimination in the workforce has 
decreased over time. Occupational discrimination prevents women from moving up in salary 
and/or position and at this point women have much more control over their economic and 
occupational futures as in times past.”1 (See Appendix B).  
 Ideology. Each participant completed measures of both gender egalitarianism and 
benevolent sexism with their order of presentation counterbalanced (See Appendix C). To assess 
endorsement of gender egalitarianism, participants were asked to rate their agreement with 6 
items modified from both the egalitarianism and inegalitarianism scale (Klugel & Smith, 1986) 
and the American national election studies egalitarianism scale (Feldman, 1988). For example, 
“If women were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems;” “There 
should be more focus on equality of outcomes for women in today's society;” “We have gone too 
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far in pushing equal rights for women in this country (reverse scored).” These items formed a 
reliable composite (α = .90).  
To assess endorsement of benevolent sexism, participants were asked to rate their 
agreement with 6 items from ambivalent sexism inventory’s benevolent sexism sub-scale (Glick 
& Fiske, 1996). For example, “Most women interpret innocent remarks as sexist;” “Women 
should be cherished and protected by men;” “Women exaggerate problems at work.” These items 
formed a reliable composite (α = .85). There was a significant, negative, relationship between 
scores on gender egalitarianism and benevolent sexism, r = -.66, p < .001.  
Manipulation of personal control. Using a pilot sample not included in main study (N = 
82), we randomly assigned women participants to view either the group-based control threat or 
the group-based control boost manipulation. Following exposure to the manipulation, 
participants indicated their agreement with 4 items modified from the Mastery scale (Pearlin et 
al., 1981; α = .89) “I feel that I have a great degree of control over what happens to me in my 
life;” “I believe that what happens to me in the future mostly depends on me;“ “I feel a high 
sense of personal control over my life;” and “I believe that I can do just about anything I really 
set my mind to.” These items were embedded in a larger list of filler items purportedly used to 
assess individual personality characteristics (See Appendix E).  
Results 
See Table 1 for a list of correlations between variables of interest and demographic 
variables. 
Manipulation check. The effect of the manipulation of sexual discrimination on 
participants’ levels of perceived personal control was tested using our pilot sample. As expected, 
participants in the group-based threat condition indicated lower perceived personal control (M = 
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4.70, SD = 1.09) in comparison to participants in the group-based boost condition (M = 5.32, SD 
= 0.84), F(1, 79) = 8.29, p = .005, η2 = .09. 
 Gender identification. The effect of random assignment to experimental condition was 
tested to ensure there was no relationship between degree of gender identification and 
experimental condition. This was done due to the prediction that gender identification would 
moderate the effects of the experimental manipulation on ideology endorsement. A one-way 
ANOVA confirmed there was no significant difference by experimental condition on 
participants’ gender identification, F(1, 150) = 1.36, p = .17. Therefore gender identification was 
employed as a moderator in all subsequent analyses. 
 Ideology. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that across conditions, participants 
were more supportive of gender egalitarianism (M = 5.58, SD = 1.33) than benevolent sexism (M 
= 3.20, SD = 1.37, p < .001). Linear regression analysis indicated a significant interaction of 
gender identification (mean centered) and experimental condition (dummy-coded as 0 = control 
boost; 1 = control threat) on gender egalitarianism, b = .48, SE = 0.22, t(146) = 2.24, p = .028. 
Analysis did not reveal a main effect of condition (b = .14, p = .50) or gender identification (b = 
.02, p = .91) on gender egalitarianism.  
Probing the interaction between gender identification and experimental condition, gender 
identification predicted greater endorsement of gender egalitarianism in the group-based control 
threat condition (b = 0.50, SE = 0.13, t(72) = 3.98, p < .001) but had no effect in the group-based 
control boost condition (b = 0.016, SE = .17, t(76) = 0.10, p = .92). Simple effects tests of 
experimental condition were conducted at both high and low levels of gender identification. For 
participants who highly identified with women (+1 SD) those in the group-based control threat 
condition endorsed gender egalitarianism significantly more than those in the group-based 
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control boost condition (b = 0.62, SE = 0.30, t(146) = 2.07, p = .04). However, for participants 
low in identification with women (-1 SD), there was no significant difference in gender 
egalitarianism by experimental condition (b = -0.34, SE = 0.33, t(146) = -1.11, p = .27; See 
Figure 1). 
Next, gender identification, experimental condition, and their interaction term were 
regressed onto benevolent sexism. Analysis did not reveal a main effect of experimental 
condition (b = -0.27, p = .22) or gender identification (mean centered; b = 0.24, p = .11) on 
benevolent sexism. As expected, analysis indicated a significant interaction, b = -0.59, SE = 0.22, 
t(146) = -2.65, p = .009. Probing this interaction within each experimental condition found that 
gender identification predicted significantly less benevolent sexism in the group-based control 
threat condition (b = -0.36, SE = 0.15, t(72) = -2.41, p = .02) but had no effect in the group-
based control boost condition (b = 0.24, SE = .16, t(76) = 1.47, p = .15).  
Simple effects tests of experimental condition were conducted at both high and low levels 
of gender identification. For participants who highly identified with women (+1 SD), those in the 
group-based control threat condition endorsed benevolent sexism significantly less so than those 
in the group-based control boost condition (b = -0.86, SE = 0.31, t(146) = -2.76, p = .006). 
However, for participants low in identification with women (-1 SD), there was no significant 
difference in benevolent sexism by experimental condition (b = 0.32, SE = 0.32, t(146) = 1.02, p 
= .30; See Figure 2). 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided evidence that a group-based threat can lower perceptions of personal 
control (pilot data), indicating that a group-based phenomena can impact individual level 
outcomes. Study 1 also showed that identification with the group prior to the experience of a 
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group-based threat moderates how individuals respond. In the group-based control threat 
condition, identification significantly predicted increased egalitarianism and decreased 
benevolent sexism, effects not present in the group-based control boost condition (H1 & H2). 
Furthermore, at high levels of group identification (+1 SD) there was a condition effect such that 
these participants were more supportive of egalitarianism, and more rejecting of benevolent 
sexism, following a group-based control threat vs. a boost (H3). These findings support the 
argument that highly identified group members are motivated to compensate for group-based 
threats to personal control by adhering to group-normative ideologies specifically, and not just 
any ideology that deals with social structure.  
One interpretation of the results of Study 1 could be that the highly identified women 
increased their endorsement of gender egalitarianism simply because this belief matched the 
source of the group-based threat (sexism). This would imply that the effects of condition on 
egalitarianism endorsement was not due to the ideology’s ability to provide a perception of order 
and structure, a function of compensatory sources predicted by CCT. The match between the 
source of the threat and the ideology endorsed is in line with prior theorizing on ideology and 
compensation. CCT argues that when available, the most applicable ideology for a specific threat 
will be used (Kay & Eibach, 2013). For example, it is more likely that an individual who feels a 
loss of personal control over their “love life” would increase belief in an ideology of “soul-
mates” to compensate rather than increase endorsement of an ideology of free market capitalism, 
as free market capitalism does not often have much to say regarding true love. Yet, an ideology’s 
relation to the source of a control threat does not exclude its ability to provide a sense of social 
structure for the individual. The effect of a group-based threat to personal control on the 
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perceived structure and order of the social relations an ideology represents, as well as its direct 
effect on ideology endorsement, was tested in Study 2 to provide evidence for this claim.  
Study 2 
 Study 2 investigated the moderating effect of group identification on how a group-based 
control threat might influence ratings of structure ascribed to a social system represented by a 
group-normative ideology (i.e., a gender equal society represented by gender-egalitarianism). 
Study 2 also investigated how perceptions of structure would influence the endorsement of a 
group-normative ideology following a threat to personal control. The same group-based control 
manipulations used in Study 1 were employed. The degree to which a gender-equal society is 
structured and ordered was measured next, followed by the endorsement of gender 
egalitarianism. It was expected that: 
H4: After exposure to a group-based threat to personal control, highly identified women 
will perceive a gender equal society as more structured than lowly identified women. 
H5: Highly identified women who are exposed to a group-based control threat will 
perceive a gender equal society to be more structured in comparison to highly identified 
women whose control was not threatened. 
and that; 
H6: For highly identified women, the perceived structure of a gender equal society will 
mediate the effect of a group-based threat to control on gender egalitarianism.  
Method 
 Participants. One-hundred sixty-eight women residing in the United States participated 
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online service for a small financial incentive ($0.45). Seven 
participants were dropped from analysis due to their failure to complete at least 50% of the study 
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materials. The final sample (N = 161) ranged in age from 18 to 73 (M = 38.17, SD = 12.85). 
Political ideology was measured on a scale from 0 = completely liberal to 100 = completely 
conservative, and the sample was skewed somewhat liberal (M = 38.51, SD = 30.11). When 
asked to indicate their ethnicity, 79.2% of participants self-categorized as White; 9.4% as Asian; 
5.9% as Black; 5.1% as Latina; and 0.4% did not indicate their ethnicity.  
 Gender identification. Individual differences in gender identification were assessed 
using the 4-item measure from Study 1. The items again formed a reliable measure (α = .89).  
 Group-based manipulation of personal control. Participants were randomly assigned 
to view one of the two group-based control manipulations from Study 1.  
Structure of gender equality. Two items assessed how structured participants perceived 
a gender-equal society to be (See Appendix D). Participants were asked: “Thinking about a 
society that is completely gender-equal, how structured do you think that society would be?” and 
“Thinking about a society that is completely gender-equal, how chaotic do you think that society 
would be (reverse scored)?” Each question was answered using a 7-point scale with 1 = not at all 
stable (chaotic) and 7 = completely stable (chaotic). These 2 items were highly correlated, r = 
.65, p < .001, and scores were combined.  
Gender egalitarianism. Each participant filled out the same 6-item measure of gender 
egalitarianism (α = .89) from Study 1.  
Results 




 Gender identification. A one-way ANOVA confirmed there was no significant 
difference by experimental condition on participants’ gender identification, F(1, 159) = 0.92, p = 
.34. Therefore gender identification was employed as a moderator in all subsequent analyses. 
 Structure of gender equality. Linear regression indicated a main effect of experimental 
condition (b = 0.40, SE = 0.21, t(157) = 2.04, p = .04), with participants in the group-based 
threat condition perceiving more structure to gender equality (M = 5.50, SD = 1.22) than 
participants in the group-based control boost condition (M = 5.07, SD = 1.54). Analysis did not 
reveal a significant effect of gender identification (b = -0.22, p = .14) on perceived structure of 
gender equality. There was a significant interaction of gender identification (mean centered) and 
experimental condition (dummy-coded as 0 = control boost; 1 = control threat) on the perceived 
structure of a gender equal society, b = 0.62, SE = 0.21, t(157) = 2.87, p = .005.  
Probing the interaction between gender identification and experimental condition, gender 
identification predicted greater perceived structure of gender equality in the group-based control 
threat condition (b = 0.40, SE = 0.13, t(80) = 2.98, p = .004) but gender identification did not 
reach significance in the group-based control boost condition (b = -0.22, SE = .17, t(77) = -1.31, 
p = .19).  
Simple effects tests of experimental condition were conducted at both high and low levels 
of gender identification. For participants who highly identified with women (+1 SD) those in the 
group-based control threat condition perceived a gender equal society as significantly more 
structured as compared with those in the group-based control boost condition (b = 1.04, SE = 
0.31, t(157) = 3.43, p < .001). However, for participants low in identification with women (-1 
SD), there was no significant difference in how structured they perceived a gender equal society 
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to be between experimental conditions (b = -0.19, SE = 0.31, t(157) = -0.65, p = .52; See Figure 
3). 
 Gender egalitarianism. Regression analysis did not reveal a main effect of condition (b 
= 0.18, p = .37) or gender identification (b = -0.22, p = .12) on gender egalitarianism. Analysis 
indicated a significant interaction between gender identification (mean centered) and 
experimental condition (dummy-coded as 0 = control boost; 1 = control threat) on gender 
egalitarianism, b = 0.53, SE = 0.20, t(157) = 2.62, p = .01. 
Probing this interaction within each experimental condition, gender identification 
predicted greater support for gender egalitarianism in the group-based control threat condition (b 
= 0.31, SE = 0.14, t(80) = 2.21, p = .03) but not in the group-based control boost condition (b = -
0.22, SE = .15, t(77) = -1.51, p = .14). Simple effects tests of experimental condition were 
conducted at both high and low levels of gender identification. Highly identified women (+1 SD) 
in the group-based control threat condition endorsed gender egalitarianism significantly more 
than those in the group-based control boost condition (b = 0.70, SE = 0.28, t(157) = 2.45, p = 
.01). However, there was no significant difference in gender egalitarianism by experimental 
condition for low identifiers (b = -0.36, SE = 0.29, t(157) = -1.26, p = .21; See Figure 4). 
 Moderated mediation. A test of whether gender equality mediated the relationship 
between gender identification and gender egalitarianism in the group-based control threat 
condition, but not in the group-based control boost condition was conducted (Figure 5). Using 
Model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples, 
two regression equations were computed. The first equation used gender identification, 
experimental condition, and their interaction term to predict perceived structure of gender 
equality. The second equation used perceived structure of gender equality, gender identification, 
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experimental condition, and the interaction of identification by condition to predict gender 
egalitarianism (Figure 5, Panel A).  
As shown earlier, the interaction between gender identification and experimental 
condition on perceived structure of gender equality was significant. Perceived structure of gender 
equality also significantly predicted gender egalitarianism, b = .51, SE = .06, t(159) = 8.27, p < 
.001. The index of moderated mediation 2 (Hayes, 2015) was significant, .31 [.09, .59]. 3 Next 
the indirect effects in both experimental conditions was tested using Model 4 of the PROCESS 
macro (Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. As displayed in panels B 
and C of Figure 5, perceived structure of gender equality mediated the effect of gender 
identification on egalitarianism in the group-based control threat condition, indirect effect = .19,  
[.05, .42], but did not in the group-based control boost condition, indirect effect = -.11 [-.31, 04].  
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the effect of gender identification moderating the endorsement of 
gender egalitarianism following a group-based threat to personal control from Study 1. Highly 
identified women (in comparison to low identifiers) were more supportive of gender 
egalitarianism after exposure to a group-based control threat (H1). At high levels of 
identification (+1 SD) women exposed to a group-based control threat were more supportive of 
egalitarianism than women not exposed to a threat (H2). Evidence that threat to control 
motivated the perception of structure and order in a social system was also found. Specifically, 
highly identified women perceived a gender-equal society as more structured and ordered in 
comparison to low identifiers following a group-based threat to personal control (H4). 
Additionally, at high level of identification (+1 SD) women exposed to threat perceived a gender 
equal society to be more structured and ordered than did women not exposed to threat (H5). 
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Finally, for highly identified women who experienced a group-based threat to personal control, 
increased perceptions of structure for a gender equal society led to an increase in egalitarianism 
(H6). This effect is important as it bridges CCT and SIT/SCT.  
CCT emphasizes that the reason individuals can use external sources for control 
compensation is due to those sources’ ability to provide structure and order to the social world 
(Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). SIT emphasizes that group identification influences the degree 
to which individuals adhere to group beliefs following a threat (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; 
Hogg & Adelman, 2013). Study 2 begins to integrate these perspectives by showing that social 
identification influences the degree to which individuals imbue a social system with structure 
and order following a loss of personal control (as predicted by SIT) and that this perceived 
structure then directly leads to an increase in ideology endorsement (as predicted by CCT).  
 Up to this point, the studies have shown that group-based threats to personal control 
motivate highly identified individuals to increase their endorsement of a group-normative 
ideology, and that this same effect is absent for low identifiers (Study 1 & Study 2). The results 
also suggest that an increase in perceived structure of the social system that an ideology 
represents can explain the effect of a threat to control on ideology endorsement. However, 
neither Study 1 nor 2 has demonstrated that this process actually works to restore a sense of 
personal control for the individual. The extent to which this process is effective in restoring 
control is the focus on Study 3. 
If gender egalitarianism is used as a compensation source, then there ought to be an effect 
of endorsement on subsequent feelings of control. Although theorized, this restoration process is 
not commonly addressed in research on compensatory control, or in research on social identity 
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and personal control. A direct test of the effectiveness of ideology endorsement on resulting 
perceptions of personal control was conducted in Study 3. 
Study 3 
 Study 3 was designed to address the effect of ideology endorsement, following a group-
based control threat, on subsequent perceptions of personal control. The same group-based 
control manipulation used in Studies 1 and 2 was employed to manipulate perceived control. 
Gender egalitarianism was measured next, followed by a measure of perceived personal control. 
It was expected that the effect of identification and threat to control on gender 
egalitarianism found in Studies 1 and 2 would be replicated. It was also expected that 
identification and threat would interact to predict perceptions of personal control after ideology 
endorsement such that; 
H7: Highly identified women will perceive more personal control than lowly identified 
women in the group-based threat to personal control experimental condition.  
H8: Highly identified women will perceive more personal control following a threat to 
control than highly identified women who did not experience a threat. 
Finally, in support of the argument that ideology endorsement can restore control following a 
threat it was expected that;  
H9: For highly identified women, gender egalitarianism will mediate the effect of a 
group-based threat to control on increased perceived personal control.   
Method 
 Participants. Two-hundred women residing in the United States participated via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online service for a small financial incentive ($0.45). Six 
participants were dropped from analysis due to their stated belief that the information in the 
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study manipulation was false. Four additional participants were dropped due to their failure to 
complete at least 50% of the study materials. The final sample (N = 190) ranged in age from 19 
to 67 (M = 37.63, SD = 12.79). Political ideology was measured on a scale from 0 = completely 
liberal to 100 = completely conservative, and the sample was skewed liberal (M = 37.47, SD = 
27.24). When asked to indicate their ethnicity, 80.5% of participants self-categorized as White; 
7.4% as Black; 5.3% as Asian; 3.7% as Latina; .05% as Native American; and 2.6% as “Other”. 
 Gender identification. Individual differences in gender identification were assessed 
using the same 4 items from Studies 1 and 2. The items again formed a reliable measure (α = 
.88).  
 Group-based manipulation of personal control. Participants were randomly assigned 
to view one of the two group-based control manipulations from Studies 1 and 2.  
Gender egalitarianism. Each participant filled out the same 6-item measure of gender 
egalitarianism (α = .85) from Studies 1 and 2.  
Perceived personal control. Each participant filled out the same 4-item measure of 
perceived personal control (Appendix E) used to assess manipulation effectiveness from Study 1 
(α = .84).   
Results 
See Table 3 for a list of correlations between variables of interest and demographic 
variables. 
 Gender identification. A one-way ANOVA confirmed there was no significant 
difference by experimental condition on participants’ gender identification, F(1, 188) = 1.23, p = 
.27. Therefore gender identification was employed as a moderator in all subsequent analyses. 
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Gender egalitarianism. Regression analysis did not reveal a main effect of condition (b 
= 0.13, p = .38) or gender identification (b = 0.12, p = .20) on gender egalitarianism. As 
predicted, the interaction between gender identification (mean centered) and experimental 
condition (dummy-coded as 0 = control boost; 1 = control threat) was significant on gender 
egalitarianism, b = 0.49, SE = 0.15, t(186) = 2.67, p = .008. 
Probing this interaction between gender identification and experimental condition, gender 
identification predicted greater support for gender egalitarianism in the group-based control 
threat condition (b = 0.53, SE = 0.10, t(91) = 5.07, p < .001) but not in the group-based control 
boost condition (b = 0.12, SE = .10, t(97) = 1.69, p = .25). Simple effects tests of experimental 
condition were conducted at both high and low levels of gender identification. For highly 
identified women (+1 SD), those in the group-based control threat condition endorsed gender 
egalitarianism significantly more than those in the group-based control boost condition (b = 
0.54, SE = 0.21, t(186) = 2.57, p = .01). However, for low identifiers (-1 SD), there was no 
significant difference in gender egalitarianism by experimental condition (b = -0.27, SE = 0.22, 
t(186) = -1.28, p = .19; See Figure 6). 
Perceived personal control. I next regressed scores of perceived personal control onto 
experimental condition (dummy-coded as 0 = control boost; 1 = control threat), gender 
identification (mean centered) and their interaction term. Analysis did not reveal a main effect of 
condition (b = 0.05, p = .69) or of gender identification (b = 0.07, p = .35). As predicted, the 
interaction between gender identification and experimental condition was significant, b = 0.40, 
SE = 0.13, t(186) = 3.15, p = .002.  
Probing this interaction of gender identification by experimental condition, I found that 
gender identification predicted greater perceived personal control in the group-based control 
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threat condition (b = 0.48, SE = 0.09, t(91) = 5.03, p < .001) but not in the group-based control 
boost condition (b = 0.07, SE = 0.08, t(97) = 0.88, p = .37). Simple effects of experimental 
condition were conducted at both high and low levels of gender identification. High identifiers 
(+1 SD) in the group-based control threat condition perceived themselves as having 
significantly more personal control than those in the group-based control boost condition (b = 
0.46, SE = 0.18, t(186) = 2.57, p = .011). Conversely, low identifiers (-1 SD) in the group-based 
control threat condition perceived themselves as having significantly less personal control 
compared with those in the group-based control boost condition, b = -0.36, SE = 0.18, t(186) = -
1.96, p = .05 (See Figure 6). 
 Moderated mediation. Next, a test was run to determine if gender egalitarianism 
mediated the relationship between gender identification and perceived personal control in the 
group-based control threat condition, but not in the group-based control boost condition (Figure 
7). Two regression equations were computed Using Model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 
2013) with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. The first equation used gender 
identification, experimental condition, and their interaction term to predict gender egalitarianism. 
The second equation used gender egalitarianism, gender identification, experimental condition, 
and the interaction of identification by condition to predict perceived personal control (Figure 7, 
Panel A).  
As noted earlier, the interaction between gender identification and experimental condition 
on gender egalitarianism was significant. Gender egalitarianism also significantly predicted 
perceived personal control, b = .21, SE = .06, t(188) = 3.40, p = .001. The index of moderated 
mediation (Hayes, 2015) was significant, .08 [.02, .19]. 4 Next, the indirect effects in both 
experimental conditions were examined using Model 4 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) 
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with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. As displayed in panels B and C of Figure 7, 
gender egalitarianism mediated the effect of gender identification on perceived personal control 
in the group-based control threat condition, indirect effect = .12 [.02, .25], but did not in the 
group-based control boost condition, indirect effect = .01 [-.01, 07].  
Discussion 
Study 3 provided consistent support for my predictions. Replicating the findings from 
Studies 1 and 2, highly identified (vs. lowly identified) women were more supportive of gender 
egalitarianism following a group-based threat to personal control (H9). Similarly, at high levels 
of gender identification (+1 SD), women were more supportive of egalitarianism following a 
threat to personal control compared to those not threatened (H10). 
Study 3 also provided evidence for the compensation process through a group-normative 
ideology. Highly identified women reported more perceived personal control after exposure to a 
group based-control threat in comparison to low identifiers in the threat condition (H7) and in 
comparison to highly identified women not exposed to threat (H7). On the surface, this effect 
may seem counterintuitive as a group-based control threat is expected to lower control rather 
than increase it. However after modeling the moderated-mediation effect of identification, threat, 
and egalitarianism on perceived personal control, the results provide clear support for the 
predictions. Following a group-based threat to personal control, highly identified women were 
able to compensate for this loss by increasing their endorsement of gender egalitarianism. This 
increased endorsement of gender egalitarianism then served to restore perceptions of personal 
control. Conversely, lowly identified women were left feeling less personal control in the threat 
condition in comparison to their counterparts not exposed to threat.  
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This study provides evidence that compensatory endorsement of a group-normative 
ideology increases feelings of personal control. While research on compensatory control has 
shown that control threat leads to increased endorsement of external systems or beliefs, and 
research on social identity has shown that identification directly influences perceived control, 
this study brings both of these effects together to show the full process of threat - to 
compensation - to restoration. These data explain in part why highly identified group members 
endorse their group’s normative beliefs and provides a clear demonstration of the effectiveness 
of ideology for control compensation.  
General Discussion 
 Across three studies, group identification moderated the effects of a group-based threat to 
personal control on the compensation process. Specifically, highly identified women (vs. low) 
responded to a group-based threat to personal control with greater endorsement of a group-
normative ideology (Studies 1, 2, & 3) and a greater rejection of a non-normative ideology 
(Study 1). Women high in gender identification endorsed gender egalitarianism (group-
normative ideology) more so after a threat than when a threat was not present (Studies, 1, 2, & 
3), providing evidence for the motivated endorsement of ideology following a threat to personal 
control. This effect supports the compensatory argument for ideology endorsement whereby 
individuals experiencing a loss of personal control are motivated to increase their support for an 
external source of structure and order. In these studies women did not simply support their 
group’s ideology because they were exposed to a group-based threat to control; nor did they 
merely endorse the ideology because they were highly identified with their group. Instead a more 
nuanced account was supported where an interaction between high identification and the 
presence of a threat to control resulted in a motivated increase in ideology endorsement.  
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In addition, high identified women perceived more structure in a social system supported 
by their group’s ideology following a group-based threat to personal control. This increased 
perception of structure directly led to an increased endorsement of the group’s ideology. This 
effect was significant when comparing women high and low in gender identification after a 
control threat, as well as when comparing women high in identification across experimental 
conditions. Similar to the effect found for ideology endorsement, perceptions of structure were 
dependent both upon the strength of group identity held by the participant, as well as the 
presence (or absence) of a group-based threat to control. This suggests that despite general 
perceptions that one social system is more structured than another (e.g., hierarchy vs. equality; 
Friesen et al., 2014), identification and the presence of a threat (or lack of one) impacts what 
social systems are seen as ordered and useful for compensation.  
 Finally, by testing whether or not the motivated endorsement of a group-normative 
ideology actually compensates for a loss of personal control, the restoration function of such 
ideology was revealed. The results from Study 3 confirm that endorsement of group-relevant 
ideology can restore perceived control. A group-based control threat motivated increased support 
for a group-normative ideology, which in turn partially explained the increase in perceived 
personal control. Although these studies provide new insight into the ways in which social 
identity influences the use of ideology to effectively compensate and restore feelings of personal 
control, they also point to fruitful avenues for future research.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Generalization. All three studies reported were comprised of women participants living 
in the U.S., and as such the generalizability of these effects to other social groups may be 
limited. However, another set of studies does suggest the applicability of these findings to other 
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groups. For example, recent work (Goode, Keefer, Branscombe, & Molina, 2015) has found that 
following a group-based threat (as opposed to a neutral condition), American participants 
reported increased national identification, and meritocracy endorsement (a normative ideology in 
America regarding hard work leading to success). In this research, increased national 
identification directly led to increased endorsement of meritocracy. Furthermore, an additional 
study found that national identification and meritocracy acted as serial mediators of the effect of 
a group-based control threat predicting increased perceptions of personal control. This is further 
evidence that compensation through endorsement of a group-normative ideology can restore 
perceptions of personal control. This work found similar results as the ones reported here with a 
different social group (i.e., Americans); however these studies used group identification as a 
mediator rather than a moderator and as such their effects are not directly comparable. More 
research will need to be done to ensure that the process reported in this paper is generalizable to 
more social groups.  
 Similarly, we cannot conclude from these studies that all women in America will react in 
the same manner. As seen in the demographics of each study, these samples were primarily 
White and liberal. In contrast to the present samples, the population of women in the United 
States is much more diverse in terms of ethnicity and political ideology, not to mention 
occupation, religion, and many other factors. The argument to this point has assumed that higher 
identification with the group women increases endorsement of gender egalitarianism because this 
ideology is normative to American women, and indeed a national poll of women revealed that the 
majority support gender equality (Wike & Simmons, 2015). However, we cannot take the results 
from a national survey as proof that all women reject notions of natural gender differences or 
ideologies that support that view, or even that their definition of “equality” equates with the 
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dissolution of any gender difference in social standing. With a larger and more diverse sample, it 
would be possible to determine whether differences in the content of a social identity, or the way 
different members define what that group represents, moderates reactions to group-based threats 
and any compensation through ideology. For example, one common way of defining women is as 
a group that is equal to men and deserving of absolute social equality (the view taken in this 
paper; Lull, Mulac, & Rosen, 1983). On the other hand, another way of defining women is as a 
group that is naturally different from men and deserving of gender-specific social roles (Smith & 
Self, 1981). By taking both perspectives into account, research might find that individuals who 
subscribe to each type of gender identity content may highly identify with the social group 
women (based upon their definition of the group), but hold diverging beliefs about the preferred 
structure of gendered relations (Skevington, & Baker, 1989). Consequently, while Study 1 
showed that highly identified women in that sample rejected benevolent sexism following a 
group-based threat to personal control, women who strongly believe in natural differences 
between sexes may have embraced benevolent sexism following a control threat as a way of 
compensating.  Instead of assuming all highly identified women support gender equality, 
research taking into account alternative definitions of the group would permit a comparative 
investigation into how definitions of a group influence the use of ideology as a source of 
compensation, further emphasizing how important group identification processes are to 
ideological endorsement. 
 Further action. While this work provides a novel account of control restoration through 
identity and ideology (Study 3), future work will need to investigate to what extent restored 
control influences future actions. According to CCT, compensating for a loss of control first re-
establishes the perception that the world is ordered and predictable, and then enables the 
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individual to confidently plan for future action. The compensatory process promotes the 
individual's sense of agency (i.e., their perceived ability to positively impact their environment) 
by situating the individual in an ostensibly predictable and unthreatening social environment 
(Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). Work within compensatory control theory has found that 
participants primed with the idea of structure (vs. randomness) express more willingness to 
engage in goal-oriented action (Studies 1 & 2) and are more likely to take steps toward achieving 
their goals (Study 3; Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimmons, & Landau, 2014). These findings support CCT's 
claim that compensation sources reassure the individual that the social world is meaningfully 
ordered and in turn re-establish optimism over the future (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimmons, & Landau, 
2014; Kay, Sullivan, & Landau, 2014). However this work does not look at how restored 
feelings of control affect expectations for future action, nor the influence of identity and ideology 
on the nature of said action. For instance, it may be that highly identified women in our samples, 
after endorsing gender egalitarianism and restoring perceived control, might have been more 
willing to engage in social action (e.g., work stoppage) aimed at decreasing sexual discrimination 
in the workplace (policy reform).  
 Prior social identity theorizing argues that a shared social identity helps group members 
to coordinate their actions and effect change within their social environment (Ellemers, de 
Gilder, & Haslam, 2004). Individuals within a group can combine their efforts in order to attain 
common goals and effectively reach desired outcomes (Haslam, Powell, & Turner, 2000). From 
this perspective, control is achieved through social influence and group cohesion, rather than 
social influence and cohesion being the result of increased control through ideology 
compensation. However, it is plausible that the reverse is true as well. Highly identified group 
members who perceive a lack of control due to their membership in a given group (e.g., sexism) 
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may use ideology to support their view of desired social relations (e.g., equality) and thereby 
restore feelings of lost control. This process may be at the heart of future action taken to address 
the source of the original threat (e.g., political movements).  
Historical evidence offers some support for this argument. In 2014, social protest erupted 
in Ferguson, Missouri following the officer-involved killing of resident Michael Brown (Suhr & 
Salter, 2014). However, citizen unrest had been pervasive in this community prior to this event. 
Many Black residents felt victimized (arguably a state of low personal control) by the police and 
local government for decades over municipal infractions that led to fines or imprisonment. 
Admonished by critics as “kangaroo courts”, local municipalities were able to extract fines from 
residents (often lower-class Black residents) for minor violations of municipal code such as 
wearing baggy pants. The protests that erupted following Mr. Brown’s death were not only about 
that most recent event, but also about generations of inequality within the community. The 
protestors pushed class and race relations in Ferguson into the national spotlight. Social pressure 
by protestors and their allies outside of Ferguson, pushed Missouri Governor Jay Nixon to enact 
legislation to stop these municipalities from profiting off minor code violations. The State 
government also enacted over 40 measures aimed at reforming the use of force by Missouri 
police officers (Craven, Stewart, & Reilly, 2015). While it must be noted that the Ferguson 
protests represent a highly intricate social event rather than a controlled psychological 
experiment, it is plausible that in this case people who felt threatened due to their group 
membership reacted to that loss of control through group identification, endorsement of group-
normative beliefs, and social action aimed at restoring their feelings of control. This historical 
event provides a template for future research on the use of control compensation for motivating 
subsequent political behaviors. 
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Ingroup bias, outgroup derogation. Finally, the present work failed to measure any 
attitudes or behaviors directed at outgroups following ideology endorsement or control 
restoration. This is an important question as previous work has shown that when the self is 
threatened via group membership, group members may derogate outgroup members as a way of 
assuaging the threat (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Branscombe, & Wann, 1994; Huo 
& Molina, 2006). It is plausible that the ideology-bolstering effects of identification after a 
group-based control threat may also influence perceptions of out-group members. In the studies 
presented, women were told their group was suffering due to sexism in the workplace. While not 
stated directly, it is plausible that the participants understood the reported sexism to be 
perpetrated by male workers. Thus, the degree to which women identify with their group and use 
ideology to compensate for a threat, might also influence their attitudes toward the people they 
see as the root of their group’s problems. While personal control may be restored by the 
compensation process, intergroup conflict may increase. This is not a critique of these 
hypothetical effects however, as depending upon the group’s social standing, outgroup animosity 
may lead to greater conflict and ultimately social justice.  
Research concerning collective action has suggested that there should be an emphasis on 
the acknowledgement of intergroup injustice. From this perspective, it is argued that 
disadvantaged groups should use collective action as a way to strengthen ingroup identity and 
cohesion, encourage the recognition of group-based injustice, and motivate further action aimed 
at changing the status quo (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Wright, & Lubensky, 
2009). Collective action seeks to address group-based injustice through social reform. If group 
members use ideology to compensate for a loss of control due to group membership, and this in 
turn restores perceived control while at the same time increasing derogation of the outgroup 
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responsible for the threat, this process could promote future political action on behalf of the 
threatened group aimed at decreasing the outgroup’s ability to threaten them in the future. 
However, outgroup derogation is also likely to be expressed by dominant groups when a 
group-based threat is experienced. For instance, when members of high status social groups 
experience threat based upon group membership (e.g., loss of numerical majority in society), 
they often perceive the threat as coming from low status groups (Danbold & Huo, 2014) and 
respond with greater prejudice and discrimination aimed at maintaining or increasing their 
dominant position (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012).  
For subordinate groups, negative attitudes toward an outgroup might motivate collective 
action aimed at decreasing intergroup inequality, yet for dominant groups, this same process may 
work to reinforce group boundaries and more strongly maintain privilege. Future research will 
need to investigate 1) if outgroup derogation is present following compensation for a group-
based threat to control, 2) if this effect is present for both subordinate and dominant groups 
following a threat, and 3) what possible outcomes might stem from outgroup derogation (e.g., 
collective action, intergroup aggression).  
Practical Implications 
The findings of the current studies provide evidence that when control is threatened based 
upon group membership, compensation through ideology is contingent upon social identification. 
After a threat, individuals who are highly identified with the group can increase their 
endorsement of the group’s shared perspective as a means of reaffirming their belief that the 
world is meaningfully structured. Compensatory control theory has gone to great lengths testing 
which external sources people will turn to in response to threat, as well as illustrating the 
overarching need for structure and order that underlies the compensation motivation (Kay et al., 
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2014). However, this theoretical perspective has neglected considering how individuals 
compensate for group-based threats to their personal control, how social identification influences 
ideology endorsement, and whether those strategies are effective means of restoring perceived 
personal control.  
 Integrating social identity and self-categorization theories into the compensatory control 
model, the present work demonstrates that when highly identified group members experience a 
group-based threat to their personal control, they see the social relations described by their 
ideology as more structured and ordered, leading to an increase in their support of the ideology. 
By increasing support for their group’s beliefs, these members are able to effectively increase 
their perceptions of personal control. These results can be incorporated within SIT/SCT as well. 
While researchers have found that group identification is a source of personal control for the 
group member (Greenaway et al., 2015), this work has not identified all of the outcomes from 
identification that are directly linked to control. The present studies illustrate that one important 
result of social identification, ideology support, can be used to compensate for a loss of control. 
Furthermore, SIT/SCT have not contemplated the structure-offering nature of identification, an 
important variable to any compensation source from a CCT perspective. Study 2 of this paper 
revealed that group identification leads to a greater perceived structure for a social system 
represented by an ideology, and this perception leads to more endorsement of the ideology. 
Future SIT/SCT research can take these effects into account and investigate what other aspects of 
group identification might be seen as offering perceptions of structure and consequently as more 
appealing for compensation when personal control is threatened.  
The results reported in this paper are particularly important with respect to their 
implications for low status groups. Members of groups that are low in social status, stigmatized, 
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underrepresented in positions of power, and discriminated against may frequently experience a 
lack of perceived personal control due to the their subordinate placement in the social structure. 
If members fail to identify with their targeted group and instead adhere to nationally-normative 
beliefs that legitimize inequality (dominant group ideologies), then personal control may be 
reaffirmed at the cost of maintaining unequal status relations. However, if individuals come to 
perceive the group-based threats to their control as illegitimate and subject to resistance, then 
increased identification with their group may promote adherence to ideologies that challenge and 
threaten the status quo (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reynolds, Jones, O’Brien, & Subasic, 2013).   
Just as group membership may be the reason that individuals have their personal control 
threatened, it may also be the avenue by which they compensate while increasing their beliefs in 
a social system that no longer withholds equality (Reynolds, Haslam, & Turner, 2102). By 
increasing our understanding of when and why individuals subscribe to certain ideologies, we 
can also increase our understanding of how these ideologies can be used for social change and 
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1. Originally a control condition was piloted tested along with the threat and boost conditions. In 
this condition women were shown a graph and text that portrayed rates of sexual discrimination 
as remaining constant over time. However women in this condition displayed similar patterns as 
women in the threat condition and their written responses showed that an overwhelming 
majority perceived a constant trend of sexual discrimination as a threat to their gender group. 
Therefore in the present studies we did not include a control condition.  
2. The index of moderated mediation is a measured parameter that quantifies the relationship 
between a proposed moderator and the indirect effect of an IV on the DV through a mediating 
variable. It applies to any mediation model in which the indirect effect is estimated as linearly 
moderated. The 95% confidence interval for the index of moderated mediation is expected to not 
include zero for a significant moderated mediation effect to be present. More detail for the 
computation and interpretation of this parameter can be found in Hayes’ (2015) paper on 
moderated-mediational analyses. 
3. An alternative model with gender identification interacting with experimental condition on 
perceived structure of equality through gender egalitarianism (as the mediator) also indicated a 
significant effect, index of moderated mediation = .30 [.06, .63]. Examining the indirect effects 
of this model in both experimental conditions resulted in parallel effects as reported above. 
Gender egalitarianism mediated the effect of gender identification on the perceived structure of 
gender equality in the group-based control threat condition (indirect effect = .14, [.003, .38]), 
but did not in the group-based control boost condition (indirect effect = -.15 [-.39, .02]. 
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4. An alternative model with gender identification interacting with experimental condition on 
perceived gender egalitarianism through perceived personal control (as the mediator) was not 



































Note. Scale ranged from 1-7; higher scores indicate greater endorsement of gender 













Interaction effect of gender identification by experimental condition on benevolent sexism 
(Study 1). 
 
Note. Scale ranged from 1-7; higher scores indicate greater endorsement of benevolent sexism; 












Interaction effect of gender identification by experimental condition on perceived structure of 











Note. Scale ranged from 1-7; higher scores indicate greater perceived structure of gender 
























Note. Scale ranged from 1-7; higher scores indicate greater endorsement of gender 












Moderated-mediational models of gender identification by experimental condition on gender 
egalitarianism through perceived structure of gender equality (Study 2) 
A. Moderated mediation (index = .31, [.09, .59]) 
 
B. Group-based control threat (indirect effect = .19 [.05, .42]) 
 








Figure 6  












Note. Scale ranged from 1-7; higher scores indicate greater endorsement of gender 











Figure 7  
Interaction effect of gender identification by experimental condition on perceived personal 











Note. Scale ranged from 1-7; higher scores indicate greater perceived personal control; *p < .05, 












Moderated-mediational models of gender identification by experimental condition on perceived 
personal control through gender egalitarianism (Study 3) 
A. Moderated mediation (index = .08 [.02, .19]) 
 
B. Group-based control threat (indirect effect = .12 [.02, .25]) 
 











Bivariate correlations (Study 1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Education -       
Income -.04 -      
Social Class .03 .63** -     
Political 
Ideology 
.06 .09 -.003 -    
Gender 
Identification 
-.02 .13 .10 .06 -   
Gender 
Egalitarianism 
-.005 -.13 -.05 -.51** .17* -  
Benevolent 
Sexism 
.007 .10 .04 .50** -.023 -.66** - 











Bivariate correlations (Study 2) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Education -       
Income .17* -      
Social Class .20** .58** -     
Political 
Ideology 
.01 .03 .11 -    
Gender 
Identification 
.01 .07 .21** .09 -   
Gender 
Egalitarianism 
-.05 .000 -.04 -.52** .06 -  
Structure .07 .02 -.007 -.46** .06 .55** - 













Bivariate correlations (Study 3) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Education -       
Income -.09 -      
Social Class .07 .60** -     
Political 
Ideology 
-.005 .04 -.02 -    
Gender 
Identification 
.08 .002 .16* -.03 -   
Gender 
Egalitarianism 
-.001 .000 .02 -.42** .27** -  
Personal 
Control 
.12 .11 .17* -.04 .25** .24** - 












Gender identification measure (Studies 1, 2, & 3) 
 
Below are some statements about how you feel about your gender group (women).  Please rate 
how much you agree or disagree with each statement using the scale below from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
1. Overall, being a woman has very little to do with how I feel about myself (reverse score). 
2. Being a woman is an important reflection of who I am. 
3. Being a woman is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (reverse score). 

















Group-based manipulation of personal control (Studies 1, 2, & 3) 
On the next page is a current Department of Justice report. PLEASE read this article closely and 
pay attention to the accompanying graph. Correctly understanding the material will help us 
collect valid information. 
 















































Gender egalitarianism measure (Studies 1, 2, & 3) 
The following statements reflect different attitudes about how gender should be treated in 
society. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with each statement using the scale below 
from  1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
1. If women were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems. 
2. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that every woman has the same 
opportunity to succeed as men do. 
3. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights for women in this country (reverse score). 
4. This country would be better off if we worried less about if all women are equal to men 
(reverse score). 
5. There should be more focus on equality of outcomes for women in today's society. 
6. It is not really that big a problem if men have more chances than women (reverse score). 
Benevolent sexism measure (Study 1) 
The following statements reflect different attitudes about how gender should be treated in 
society. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with each statement using the scale below 
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
1. Women are too easily offended. 
2. Most women interpret innocent remarks as sexist. 
3. Women fail to appreciate all men do for them. 
4. Women exaggerate problems at work. 
5. Women should be cherished and protected by men. 




Perceived structure of gender equality measure (Study 2) 
The next part of this study involves indicating your level of agreement with a number of 
statements. Please read each statement carefully, and then go with your first instinct as to your 
level of agreement.  
1. Thinking about a society that is completely gender-equal, how structured do you think that 
society would be? 
Not at all 
structured . . . . . 
Completely 
structured 
              
 
2. Thinking about a society that is completely gender-equal, how chaotic do you think that 
society would be? (reverse scored)  
Not at all 
chaotic . . . . . 
Completely 
chaotic 
              
 












Perceived personal control measure (Studies 1 & 3) 
The following statements are related to your own unique personality and can help us get a picture 
of who you are as a person. Please think about how much you agree or disagree with each 
statement below and rate your agreement using the scale below from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 
(Strongly Agree). 
1. I feel that I have a great degree of control over what happens to me in my life. 
2. I believe that what happens to me in the future mostly depends on me. 
3. I feel a high sense of personal control over my life. 
4. I believe that I can do just about anything I really set my mind to. 
 
Filler items added to perceived personal control measure used to mask intent in pilot sample 
from Study 1. 
1. I like to keep to myself most of the time. 
2. I often like trying new things like food or activities. 
3. I find crowds somewhat unsettling. 
4. I like to meet new people and enjoy making small talk with strangers. 
5. I enjoy abstract paintings. 
6. Small pets annoy me. 
7. I enjoy traveling. 






Demographic variables (Studies 1, 2, & 3) 
“Please indicate your highlest level of education.” 
1. Some school 
2. GED 
3. High School Graduate 
4. Some College 
5. Associates Degree 
6. Bachelor’s Degree 
7. Masters Degree 
8. Doctoral Degree 
“Which category best describes your current household income?” 
1. Less than $15,000 
2. $15,001 - $25,000 
3. $25,001 - $35,000 
4. $35,001 - $50,000 
5. $50,001 - $75,000 
6. $75,001 - $100,000 
7. $100,001 - $150,000 
8. Greater than $150,000 
“What social class do you feel you belong to?” 
1. Poor 
2. Working Poor 
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3. Working Class 
4. Middle Class 
5. Upper Middle Class 
6. Upper Class 
7. Rich 
“How would you describe your political outlook? Please slide the marker to indicate your level 
of political outlook.” 
 
 
